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SPECIAL CARE: MEDICAL DECISIONS AT THE BEGINNING OF LIFE. 
By Fred M. Frohock Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1986. 
Pp. xiii, 263. $19.95. 
Special Care is an examination of the ethical issues that confront 
society over the treatment of profoundly ill infants. If treated, these 
infants might survive only in perpetual pain, or in a state of uncon-
sciousness, or as prisoners to life support mechanisms. When should 
doctors withhold treatment even though they might have the means to 
prolong life? Here technology outpaces moral philosophy; the ques-
tions posed are not only exceedingly difficult, but divisive as well. 
Recently, there have been several well-publicized "Baby Doe" 
cases, where parents decided not to pursue treatment for their seri-
ously ill infants. 1 These decisions not to treat the infants have "galva-
1. The two most celebrated cases of parents wishing to withhold treatment from seriously ill 
infants were known as "Baby Doe" cases. The first occurred in Bloomington, Indiana in 1982. 
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nized American social reformers"2 and have caused the right-to-life 
movement to embark on what has been referred to as a "crusade" to 
prevent doctors and parents from withholding treatment from severely 
ill children. 3 The Reagan administration sided with the right-to-life 
movement and forced hospitals to post notices stating that the failure 
to feed and care for handicapped infants is prohibited by federal law 
and providing phone numbers for anyone with information about 
violations.4 
Special Care was written within the context of the Baby Doe con-
troversy. 5 Professor Frohock6 spent four months in the neonatal in-
tensive care nursery of a well-respected hospital (which he declined to 
identify) to gather information on this subject. The hospital displayed 
one of the notices required by federal law (p. 27). Frohock had com-
plete access to the ward and to those who worked there. 
Frohock disagrees with the position of the right-to-life movement, 
and this disagreement pervades his impressions. Moreover, Frohock 
mistrusts the intrusion of the legal system into the decisions of when to 
terminate treatment, and uses a right-to-life attorney as an example of 
the problems of legal intervention in these issues. In his conclusion, 
Frohock not only expresses his dissatisfaction with the concept of a 
right to life, but with the concept of rights altogether. 
On the whole, though, Special Care is not a polemic. Throughout 
most of the book, Professor Frohock presents the issues through the 
cases of actual infants. Ten of Special Care's eleven chapters consist of 
the author's observations, interspersed with fragments of interviews 
with the doctors, nurses, and the parents whose infants depend on the 
care of the nursery. Only the last chapter approaches the dilemma of 
terminating treatment theoretically. 
Professor Frohock is a passive but not dispassionate observer. His 
impressions are written in a journal format and are organized chrono-
logically. Rather than presenting a succession of case studies with 
problems posed and the manner of solution announced within a few 
pages, the author describes the infants as he saw them. They are char-
See, e.g., Comment, The Legacy of Infant Doe, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 699 (1982); Comment, Defec-
tive Newborns: Inconsistent Application of Legal Principles Emphasized by the Infant Doe Case, 
14 TEXAS TECH L. REv. 569 (1983). The following year a similar case, referred to as the Baby 
Jane Doe case, arose on Long Island. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 
N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 (1983); Kerr, Reporting the Case of Baby Jane Doe, 14 HASTING 
CENTER REP., Aug. 1984, at 7. For a general discussion and comparison of the two cases, see J. 
LYON, PLAYING Goo IN THE NURSERY 22-58 (1985). 
2. See J. LYON, supra note 1, at 39. 
3. Id. 
4. See Fost, Putting Hospitals on Notice, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1982, at 5. 
5. In the past year, several books have been written about this same issue. See, e.g., J. LYON, 
supra note l; E. SHELP, BORN TO DIE (1986). 
6. Professor Frohock is the chairman of the political science department at Syracuse Univer-
sity. He has written books on political theory, public policy, and law and morals. 
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acters in the drama of life, not mere case studies, and Frohock suc-
ceeds in making them real enough so that all but the most callous 
reader will care about them as well. 
For example, the infant Stephanie is a girl with an incurable dis-
ease that causes the skin to blister constantly.7 She can not eat be-
cause the skin in her mouth and esophagus also blisters. Few children 
suffering from the disease Stephanie has live past their second year. 
Stephanie lives in constant pain, yet she also responds affectionately to 
love, as all babies do. The reader, by becoming familiar with the case 
of Stephanie, as well as those of the other infants, can begin to appreci-
ate the conflict between the desire to keep human beings alive and the 
desire to spare these infants from unceasing, excruciating pain. 
Special Care differs from most scholarly works8 in that the author 
invites his emotions to form his judgment. Frohock is willing to admit 
that no purely rational response to these infants is possible. Illustra-
tive of this is a discussion concerning a decision by parents to end 
treatment: 
Yet no one can say- morally, rationally- that enough is enough, for 
no alternative to what is being done for [the infant] makes any better 
sense. Her doctors and her parents are simply deciding without gui-
dance. There do not appear to be any right answers .... [T]he pain of 
the choices and the pain that [she] feels, are not touched by more ra-
tional procedures in medical decisions. [p. 137] 
Contrasted with a sympathetic view of perplexed parents is Fro-
hock's mistrust of the legal system. He criticizes Lawrence Washburn, 
a right-to-life attorney who initiated the Baby Jane Doe case,9 for his 
legal approach to these life and death issues: 
Washburn's proposals introduce the logic oflaw into medical practice -
disinterestedness, adversarial proceedings, conclusive decisions, objective 
interests, and even rights. It is not easy to see how a legal hearing can 
remain consistent with the special commitments, consultative and coop-
erative actions, serial and tentative decisions, and particularized interests 
of neonatology. Reform by its nature intends to change the object of its 
attention to something better. But it is important to understand how 
much of medical practice will be changed if therapy decisions are gov-
erned by judicial review. [p. 124] 
Frohock finds the doctors' approach to these issues far more appealing 
than the lawyers' approach, preferring the "cooperative" nature of 
7. The disease is known as epidennolysis bullosa. See A. RUDOLPH, PEDIATRICS 827-29 
(17th ed. 1982). 
8. For example, J. LYON, supra note 1, contains several case studies, but also a far more 
abstract discussion of the issue, and a collection of the the views of many experts. E. SHELP, 
supra note 5, is similar. 
9. See Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 456 N.E.2d 1186, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63 
(1983); Levine, Gallo & Steinbock, The Case of Baby Jane Doe, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP., 
Feb. 1984, at 10. 
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medicine to the "adversarial" nature of the legal system.10 He also 
sees legal decisions as inappropriate to medical cases. Medical deci-
sions are "serial and remedial" (p. 123) and can be changed as new 
information becomes available. Legal decisions, on the other hand, 
are "singular and decisive" (p. 123). 
Frohock's distaste for the legal system, while understandable in the 
context of his disagreement with certain decisions, is misplaced. 
While the goals of medicine might be cooperative in contrast to the 
adversity of a lawsuit, it must be remembered that the Baby Doe case 
in Indiana was brought to court by one doctor who disagreed with the 
decision of another. 11 Conflicts are often undesirable, especially in 
health care, but they are also inevitable; and the judicial system must 
resolve them. One observer has noted that the courts are the proper 
arbiters of this issue if "interests other than those of the infant and in 
the sanctity of life [are to] be considered."12 
Frohock's criticism of the "singular and decisive" nature of legal 
decisions is also inappropriate. While decisions in our common law 
culture take on the effect of law, they are not absolute and are inter-
preted and amended as factual situations change. Similarly, medical 
decisions, while made on a case-by-case basis, still create guidelines 
and precedents which doctors tend to follow.13 
Surprisingly, Frohock pays little attention to the greatest draw-
back of the legal system in these cases, the time factor. Litigation is 
very time consuming, and the lives of these infants are often very 
brief.14 Not only does this extremely abbreviated time span for judi-
cial decisions and appellate review result in the absurdities of on-
again/ off-again treatment, but neither the attorneys nor the courts 
have the time to develop their arguments and decisions to the neces-
sary degree of complexity this issue deserves. 
The last chapter of Special Care, entitled "Languages of Evalua-
tion," abandons the journal format for a more traditional essay. Fro-
hock discusses the ethical dilemmas of extreme neonatal care without 
using "rights language," but instead using the concept of "harm.:' 
10. P. 123. For other discussions on this topic, see Robertson, Legal Norms and Procedures 
for Withholding Care from Incompetent Patients: The Role of Law in Passive Euthanasia, in 
FRONTIERS IN MEDICAL ETHICS: APPLICATIONS IN A MEDICAL SETIING 99 (y. Abernathy ed. 
1980); LAW AND ETHICS IN HEALTH CARE (J. McKinlay ed. 1982); Comment, Withholding 
Treatment from Defective Newborns: Substituted Judgment, Informed Consent, and the Quinlan 
Decision, 13 GONZAGA L. REV. 781 (1978). 
11. J. LYON, supra note 1, at 28. 
12. Longino, Withholding Treatment from Defective Newborns: Who Decides and on What 
Criteria?, 31 KAN. L. REv. 377, 403 (1983). 
13. One alternative to the legal system is a hospital ethics committee to set guidelines. While 
this is extra-judicial, the decisions are no more rigid, or less inflexible, than legal decisions. See 
generally American Academy of Pediatrics, A Proposal for an Ethics Committee, 13 HASTINGS 
CENTER REP., Dec. 1983, at 6-7; Longino, supra note 12, at 402-03. 
14. See, e.g., J. LYON, supra note 1, at 74; Longino, supra note 12, at 381 n.30. 
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While he admits that rights are important, in this context he sees them 
both as an impediment and as an incorrect way of thinking about the 
issue. Frohock views rights as "a shield insulating the individual from 
regulation by others without . . . obligating the individual to any ac-
tion" (p. 203). By keeping people alive without any other reason than 
a concept of a right, he feels that the "right to life has been trans-
formed into an obligation to live - which is not a right at all" (p. 
204). 
Frohock accuses the rights concept of obfuscating the interests of 
babies by ignoring the fact that health, not simply the maintenance of 
life, is the primary goal of medicine. "A right is a blocking device, a 
term that sets the individual off from the community. What is needed 
in neonatal nurseries is a clear statement on how individual interests 
occur within communities" (p. 214). Earlier, Frohock states, 
[I]t is important to remember that rights are the instruments to represent 
deeper values, the conclusions of a hypothetical dialogue on the meaning 
and importance of individual life, not items valuable in themselves or 
simplistic trump cards to stop discourse on values. Seen in this way, a 
discussion of rights can admit the question - are there alternative in-
struments to realize the values we want to protect? [p. 204] 
Frohock believes there is an alternative way to look at these issues. 
He prefers to use the language of harm, as in the Hippocratic oath's 
injunction to "do no harm."15 This language would allow doctors to 
withhold treatment in cases in which treating the patient would do 
him more "harm" than would allowing him to die. 
A harm principle may be the more basic consideration in life-and-death 
issues. Maintaining life seems justified on the thought that death harms 
individuals in the worst possible way. . . . But if death can be merciful 
on occasion, then the principle justifying life may require that death be 
sought as a way to avoid harm. The best we may be able to do in critical 
situations within the constraints of primary goods and life forms is to 
recognize the deeper interests of the individual in avoiding harm. This 
recognition, painful and imperfect as it often is, reconstructs the condi-
tions of an individual's life to determine how harm can be avoided. [p. 
209] 
Frohock's view really does not solve the complex dilemma. His 
hostility to the right-to-life position leads him to criticize rights, rather 
than simply that position's expression of rights. The concept of harm, 
in the hands of absolutists, would treat death as the worst possible 
harm, and thus not be all that different. Rights, and even the right to 
life, need not be absolute. It is a rare right that does not, at some 
15. P. 204. The author lists three types of harm: physical pain, emotional pain, and depriva-
tion. Physical pain is allowable for therapeutic value, as is emotional pain. Otherwise, they 
should be avoided. Deprivation, meaning deprivation of some measurable time of life, is the 
most complicated aspect. There is no readily accepted answer as to when death is preferable to 
continued treatment. For example, those who advocate the right-to-life position feel that the 
answer is never. Pp. 206-09. 
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point, conflict with another one. Is· not the concept of "harm" another 
name for the "right" to be free from the infliction of unnecessary pain? 
One can fully accept both the language of rights and the proposition 
that care may be terminated at some point. The values necessary in a 
harm evaluation are no simpler to calculate16 than the point at which 
one right takes over from another. 
While Frohock has not succeeded in providing a convincing frame-
work in which to solve the dilemma, that is more a function of the 
nature of the issue than the shortcomings of the author. The book is a 
fascinating look inside the nursery, one which can give minds predis-
posed to legal methods insight into the perceptions of those intimately 
involved with these life-and-death dilemmas. Frohock adds a human 
element to a debate which often gets lost in abstractions. 
- Jonathan H. Margolies 
16. In Fro hock's argument in favor of the harm principle, he includes a discussion of "Bayes-
ian decision-rules" and equations to calculate rational decisions of when it is uncertain to con-
tinue treatment. Pp. 209-10. While his assertion that there are points at which "even the best life 
is equal in value to death when the treatment is highly likely to produce a permanent comatose 
condition," p. 211, may well be true, it is still impossible to fill in the variables of the equation 
with purely rational rules. 
